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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT-MINOR'S CAPACITY
TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL-Six weeks after
pleading guilty without counsel to a burglary charge, the men-
tally competent nineteen year old defendant moved to set aside
the judgment and that he be allowed to plead not guilty. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas held, with three judges dissenting, that because
of the age of the defendant, he was too young and inexperienced to
plead guilty to a serious charge without an attorney, notwithstanding
the fact that he had refused the trial court's offer to appoint
counsel for him. Meeks v. State, 396 S.W.2d 306 (Ark. 1965).
This decision by the Arkansas Court would appear to be the
final step in the dramatic reversal of the early English common
law rule that a person charged with treason or a felony was denied
counsel except for legal questions raised by the accused himself.1
While even Lord Coke defended this rule, believing that in felonies
the court itself was counsel for the accused, 2 experience has shown
that this protection is inadequate." It is not surprising then that
our constitution guarantees the right to counsel,' and that the
failure of the trial court to appoint counsel may be a denial of
due process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.5
The sixth amendment right to counsel, however, may be
waived,6 and the question becomes, as in the instant case, what
is an effective waiver. The decisions reveal three instances in which
the court will find the defendant has not waived the offer of counsel.
7
Obviously the defendant should not be held to have waived a right
of which he has no knowledge, and thus there is no waiver where
the accused is not advised of his right to have counsel." While
this area has probably provoked the most litigation, the decisions
1. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 192 (1924).
2. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 698 et. seq. and notes (Sth ed. 1927).
3. Judges cannot "direct the defense, or participate in those necessary conferences
between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the
confessional." Powell v. Alabama, supra note 1 at 61 (opinion of Sutherland, J) ; 4
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 355 (1758, Lewis' ed. 1897).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right . .to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.' Compare, N.D. CENT. COos
29-01-06(1) (1960).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, supra note 1.
6. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
7. Swagger v. State, 227 Ark. 45, 296 S.W.2d 204 at 208 (1956) (dissent of Ward,
J). Those decisions based on the haste of the proceedings, e.g., De Meerleer v. Michigan,
329 U.S. 663 (1947) ; State v. Jackman, 93 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1958), are considered here
under the category of failure to advise defendant of his rights.
8. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, aupra note 6; Powell v. Alabama, supra note 1; Swagger
v. State, supra note 7.
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of the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama9 and
Gideon v. Wainwright'° have so firmly established the right to have
counsel at trial that. the question now involves a determination of
when this right arises in the proceedings before trial."" Neither is
a waiver found when the accused chooses to defend himself and dur-
ing the trial some legal question arises which the accused, though
of full age and sound mind, c o u 1 d not possibly comprehend.
12
Finally, we have the situation involved in the instant case where
the courts, since Johnson v. Zerbst," have held it in error to permit
a young, inexperienced person to plead guilty to a serious charge
where he has no attorney,' 4 or where the accused lacks mental
capacity to waive the offer of counsel. 5
Clearly the decision under review is not based on the mental
condition of the defendant as the state hospital found him to be
normal. 6 By basing its decision on the sole factor of the age of
the defendant, the Arkansas Court challenges the vast majority of
the opinions holding that minority itself does not prevent an
intelligent waiver.17 New York, for example, has refused to reverse
the conviction of a sixteen year old defendant,' 8 and in fact even
refused to hold a hearing as to his mental capacity. 19 An Iowa
decision20 found an effective waiver by a seventeen year old saying
age was not the controlling factor in determining the effectiveness
of the waiver, and furthermore, the court stated, if there is some
arbitrary age under which a waiver is ineffective, it should be
designated by the legislature. 2'
The decision is also broader than those based on the defendant's
age alone. While the Arkansas Court had found an ineffective waiver
by a nineteen year old defendant before,2 2 there was also a question
of his mental condition in that case.2 3 Those decisions in other
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. Escobedo v. Illinois 378 US * 478 (1964) (Interrogation) ; Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 at 448 (1958) (dissent of Douglas, J.) "... [T]he accused who wants a
counsel should have one at any time after the moment of arrest."
12. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949). The cases in this area generally also Involve
a finding that defendant was not advised of his right to counsel or that the defendant's
YOuth, ignorance or other incapacity made a trial without counsel unfair; cI. e.g., Uveges
v. Pennsylvania, supra note 6 at 441; United States v. Murphy, 214 F. Supp. 642 at 646
(N.D.N.Y. 1963).
13. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
14. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra note 6; Willey v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 516, 178 P.2d
246 (1947) ; State v. Oberst 127 Kan. 412, 273 Pac. 490 (1929).
15. Wade v. Mayo, 334 UJ.S. 672 (1948) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) ; People
v. Hardin, 207 Cal. App. 2d 336 24 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1962).
16. Meeks v. State, 396 S.W.2d 306 at 308 (Ark. 1965) (dissent of Harris C. J
17. People v. Hardin, supra note 15; Carpentier v. Lainson, 248 Iowa 1 2 7 5, 84 N.KW.2d
32 (1957) ; State v. Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962).
18. In re Criml, 105 N.Y.S.2d 620 (App.Div. 1951) ; Aff'd People v. Criml, 303 N.Y. 749,
103 N.E.2d 638 (1952).
19. People v. Crim, supra note 18; accord People v. Begue, 143 N.Y.S.2d 474 at 477
(Sup.Ct. 1955). Contra People v. Cline, 200 N.t.S.2d 111 at 112 (App.Div. 1960) "Whether
defendant was depriveA of his right to representation by an attorney connot be determined
without a hearing." In this case, however, it appeared defendant was not advised of his
right to counsel.
20. Carpentier v. Lainson, supra note 17.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Swagger v. State, 227 Ark. 45 296 S.W.2d 204 (1956).
23. Swagger v. State, aupra note 2; Meeks v. State, aupra note 16 at 309 (dissent of
Ward, J).
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states based exclusively on age have only proceeded to the age
of seventeen. 24 It is also interesting to note that in those cases
the courts have based their decisions on the fact that defendant
could not contract, marry, make a will, or be drafted. 25 In the
instant case, however, the nineteen year old defendant was subject
to the draft,2 6 could make a will,27 marry, 28 and contract without
the disabilities of minority.29 In fact, almost the only thing he
could not do was plead guilty to a felony without advice of counsel. 80
It would appear then that in regard to the foregoing situation
the fact that this defendant had not reached his majority is almost
without practical legal significance. Certainly there is nothing
magical about the age of twenty-one. It is difficult to believe that a
nineteen year old defendant, literate and with normal mentality,
has insufficient capacity to realize "when he has stolen a car,
robbed a man, accosted a woman, or broken into a house." s While
he may not have the capacity to defend himself on trial, at least
he has the necessary mental capacity to plead guilty.8 2 The decision
thus seemingly becomes the final step in reversing the common
law position discussed earlier, because by holding this defendant
without capacity to waive counsel, the court would appear to be
saying that no one, regardless of age, has such capacity.
Even though there are no cases holding that no one has capacity
to waive counsel, the position is not entirely w i t h o u t support. 8
For example in Powell v. Alabama 8' the Supreme Court stated,
"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. . . .He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." 85  --
The view that no one can waive counsel is attractive for its
liberality, but this view does not solve the problem. The problem
in cases where the courts have found an ineffective waiver of
counsel is that it often puts the prosecution at an unfair disadvan-
tage on retrial. Important witnesses may have died or their memory
24. Willey v. Hudspeth, 162 Ran. 516, 178 P.2d 246 (1947) ; State v. Oberst, 127 Kan.
412, 273 Pac. 490 (1929).
25. Willey v. Hudspeth, supra note 24 at 249.
26. 62 Stat 604 § 4, 50 U.S.C. App. 454 (1948).
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. §60-401 (Supp. 1965).
28. ARIc. STAT. ANN. §55-102 (Supp. 1965).
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-2001 (Repl. 1962).
30. Note that in some states defendant could also have voted. See e.g., Ky. CONST.
§145.
31. Meeks v. State, 396 S.W.2d. 306 (Ark. 1965) (dissent of Ward, J.).
32. The fundamental difference between these two capacities is the basis for the
decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Zerbst decision is heavily relied
upon by the majority here, but they apparently Ignored this distinction. See, dissent of
Ward, J.
33. The Supreme Court Rules in Illinois provide that "In no case shall a plea of
guilty or waiver of indictment be received or accepted from a minor under the age of
18 years, unless represented by counsel." ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 110 § 101.26(4) (Smith-Hurd
1955). Moreover the Iowa court in Carpentier v. Lainson, 248 Iowa 1275, 84 N.W.2d 32
at 37 (1957), said it would prefer a rule that everyone under 21 be required to have
counsel.
34. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35. Id at 69. See also, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 at 446 (1958) (dissent of
Douglas, J.).
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dimmed, a retrial may place the defendant in double jeopardy, 6
or the trial court may find itself without jurisdiction.87 In their
zealous protection of the accused's liberty, the courts have correctly
refused to uphold the conviction merely because the prosecution
will be in a difficult position on retrial. The mere requirement of
appointing counsel in every instance, whether waived or not, how-
ever, only moves the problem to a more sophisticated level and is
no guarantee that the first conviction will be upheld. The defendant
may refuse to cooperate with counsel or the court may find that
the incompetency of the counsel appointed entitles the accused to
another trials8 and once again the prosecution may face the above
disadvantages on retrial.
By refusing to accept the defendant's waiver of counsel, the
court may also find itself in the anomalous position of denying the
defendant equally valuable rights. If the mere right to refuse the
aid of counsel89 is without practical significance, the right of a
defendant to place himself on the mercy of the court by pleading
guilty without counsel has more substance.40 For example, in the
instant case, the trial judge found as a fact that defendant probably
received a shorter sentence by his plea.4 1 Certainly this right is
equally violated by refusing to accept the waiver be the defendant
nineteen or twenty-nine.
The inescapable conclusion in reviewing this case is that the
Arkansas Court goes too far in over-turning the conviction merely
because the defendant has not reached his majority. The better
view and the view of most courts is that before reversing a convic-
tion the court should require a factual finding that the defendant
was incapable of adequately defending himself, or that he was
unable to obtain counsel, or that he did not "intelligently and under-
standingly waive counsel. '4 2 The age and education of the defendant,
and the gravity of the crime charged should only be elements in
the consideration of whether he had capacity to waive counsel. 43
While the North Dakota Court has not considered the precise
1
36. The decisions have not actually gone so far. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). But there is indication that in future decisions the court will indeed find
double jeopardy in a new trial after a defendant's successful anpeal from a conviction.
Cf Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) : compare also. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 464 (1958) (dissent of Douglas and Black, JJ) ; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958)
(dissent of Douglas and Black, JJ).
37. Where the defendant has been committed to the penitentiary following conviction
the court loses Jurisdiction, Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S.W. 1005 (1926). The
defense Is generally defeated, however, by saying the conviction is void and with no effect.
United States v. Bozza, 155 F.2d 592 at 595 (3rd Cir. 1946) ; Swagger v. State, 227 Ark.
45. 296 S.W.2d 204 (1956).
38. Cf., Mitchell v. United States. 259 F.2d 787 at 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For other
problems connected with effective appointment of counsel see, Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942) (conflicting Interests); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961)
(failure to permit consultation). See generally, COMMENT, Incompetency of Counsel as a
Ground for Attacking Criminal Conviction, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 400 (1956-57).
39. U.S. CONST. amend IX. See, State v. Thomlinson, 100 N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1960).
40. Cf., State v. Thomlinson, supra note 39.
41. M eeks v. State 396 S.W.2d 306 at 307 (Ark. 1965).
42. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 at 789 (1945).
43. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) ; People v. Hardin, 207 Cal. App. 2d
336, 24 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1962) ; Carpentler v. Lainson, 248 Iowa 1275, 84 N.W.2d 32 (1957).
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issue presented in the instant case, it has considered three related
problems. In one case,4 the court found an ineffective w a i v e r
because of the "unconscionable haste" with which the nineteen year
old defendant was sentenced for murder.4 5 An effective waiver was
found however, where an eighteen year old claimed his plea of guilty
had been influenced by promises of a lighter sentence. 46 In State v.
Jackman,'47 the most recent case considered by the court in this
area, it found an effective waiver because of the defendant's prior
experience with criminal proceedings even though the twenty year
old defendant claimed he thought he was waiving counsel in juvenile
and not criminal proceedings. The intimation from these decisions,
particularly the Jackman decision' 8 is that when the issue is pre-
sented to the court it will follow the more favorable majority view
set out herein rather than base its decision solely on the age of
the defendant.
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INSURANCE-POLICY PAYABLE TO WIFE-EFFECT OF PROPERTY
SETTLEMENTS-Under a property settlement agreement the wife was
to transfer and release any and all interest in certain policies
on her divorced husband's life in which she was the named bene-
ficiary. The agreement further provided that the insured was given
the right to designate beneficiaries and to exclude the wife if he
so desired. The insured made no attempt to change the beneficiary
and died six months after the final divorce decree. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas, three justices dissenting, held that the divorced
wife was foreclosed to claim any interest in or proceeds from the
policies in light of the specific transfer to the decedent. The dis-
senting justices reasoned that the provision in the settlement
providing for a change of beneficiary "if the insured so desired,"
should be given effect when considered with his inaction, and that
this clearly indicated a desire not to exclude the divorced wife
as named beneficiary. Brewer v. Brewer, 390 S.W.2d 630 (Ark.
1965).
This case exemplifies one of the p r o b I e m s with which the
courts have struggled when determining the effect of p r o p e r t y
settlement agreements on the right to proceeds of a life insurance
policy. Although not considered in most cases, there is some con-
44. State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949).
45. Note that under our classification this decision really Involves a finding that the
defendant was not advised of his right to have counsel; see supra note 7.
46. State ex rel Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND. 340, 27 N.W.2d 849 (1947).
47. 93 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1958),
48. See, Id at 429.
379
